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abstract
This article discusses U.S. biofuel production as a strategy for climate change mitigation, describing how 
energy independence and greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals may not be met as easily as initially 
hoped. Alternatively, it positions biofuel production as an “environmental fix,” a socio-ecological project in-
dicative of the contradictory imperatives to conserve, exploit, and create resources for accumulation. It exam-
ines how this “fix” has developed in rural production areas, focusing on Iowa, in the United States. It also 
describes how rural residents negotiate a biofuels future that bears significant ecological and economic risks, 
while it maintains accumulation opportunity for dominant energy and agro-industry actors. 
Key words: biofuels, climate change policy, agriculture, Iowa, political economy, agro-ecology.
resumen
Este artículo discute la producción de biocombustibles en Estados Unidos como una estrategia para mitigar 
el cambio climático, mostrando cómo las metas de independencia energética y de reducción de emisiones 
de gases de efecto invernadero podrían no alcanzarse tan fácilmente como se esperaba en un principio. 
Alternativamente, sitúa la producción de biocombustibles como un “fijo ambiental”,  un proyecto socioecológico 
indicador de la contradictoria exigencia de conservar, explotar y crear recursos para la acumulación. Examina 
cómo se ha desarrollado este “fijo” en lugares de producción rurales, enfocándose en Iowa, Estados Unidos. 
Describe asimismo cómo los residentes de zonas rurales lidian con un futuro de biocombustibles que implica 
severos riesgos ecológicos y económicos, mientras que mantiene la oportunidad de acumulación para los 
actores dominantes de las industrias energética y agro-industrial.
Palabras clave: biocombustibles, política de cambio climático, agricultura, Iowa, economía política, agroecología.
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IntroductIon: global bIofuel ProductIon’s exPandIng reach
Global biofuel production soared over the last decade. In 2001, production totaled 
5.26 billion gallons (19.9 billion liters) annually, and by 2010 that number more than 
quintupled, reaching 28.45 billion gallons (107.7 billion liters) per year (useia, 2012). 
The United States, Brazil, and the European Union (EU) are responsible for the vast 
majority of global production, but biofuels’ geographical imprint is expanding (see 
Figure 1). Newly producing countries’ output is miniscule compared to the sheer 
volumes of biofuels produced by the U.S. and Brazil, but the biofuel-related change 
that is occurring in these places may have disproportionate socio-ecological conse-
quences. Indeed, recent massive biofuel production increases have been highly con-
troversial due to the uneven and sometimes dramatic effects of their production 
across the globe. 
Figure 1
GLOBAL ETHANOL PRODUCTION
Source: rfa, 2011; useia, 2012.
Documented impacts include: foreign “land grabs,” reorganization of land tenure 
arrangements, undermined food provisioning systems (Borras et al., 2011); exacer-
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bation of food insecurity and hunger through pressure on land bases and food prices 
(Bello, 2009; Jonasse, 2009; Naylor et al., 2007); uneven and often negative conse-
quences for rural livelihood opportunities (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones, 2010; 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 2010; Bello, 2009); and ecological change of enormous mag-
nitude that carries consequences for carbon emissions and habitat availability (Dale 
et al., 2010; Fargione et al., 2008; Searchinger et al., 2008). Meanwhile, proponents 
continue to argue that biofuels offer an opportunity for improving energy security, 
reducing global greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions, and improving investment in rural 
economic development. 
In the U.S. and EU, biofuel production increases are driven by policy with the 
stated intent to mitigate climate change. EU initiatives ask biofuels to replace 10 per-
cent of transportation fuels by 2020. The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (rfs) man-
dates the production of 36 billion gallons of biofuels per year by 2022, up from the 
1.7 billion gallons produced in 2001. Over 90 percent of current U.S. biofuel output 
is corn-based ethanol produced in the U.S. Midwest, but the EU mandates will rely 
much more heavily on imports. In both cases, biofuel policies will create significant 
demand for agricultural products, raise global agricultural commodity and food prices, 
and generate significant agricultural change. As I describe below, the consequences of 
biofuels for agriculture may be significant, even if biofuels’ contributions to climate 
change mitigation are minimal. 
In this article, I explore the social and ecological dimensions of biofuel policy 
and production that help explain tensions between the biofuel policy goal of reducing 
ghgs and outcomes for rural producing areas. This analysis helps reveal possible trade-
offs and issues to consider when moving forward with greenhouse-gas-reduction, 
agricultural, rural economic, and environmental policy objectives. Drawing on the 
U.S. case, I argue that U.S. biofuel production and use can be understood as an “en-
vironmental fix,” a socio-ecological project indicative of the contradictory capitalist 
imperatives to conserve, exploit, and create resources for accumulation. I also suggest 
that stimulating and regulating agricultural production for biofuels based on carbon 
content alone contributes to ineffective climate change policy that ignores important 
socio-ecological dimensions of agriculture.
In the following section, I provide a very brief history of U.S. biofuel production, 
which has been variously positioned as a tool for bolstering rural economic develop-
ment, improving energy security, and reducing ghg emissions. I then highlight how 
biofuel initiatives’ role as climate policy has focused U.S. policy negotiation on their 
ghg content, instead of broader socio-ecological issues. I go on to describe how biofu-
els, given their small contribution to climate change mitigation, but big promise for 
business-as-usual investment opportunities, are best understood as an environmental 
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fix. I then describe the dynamics of this “fix” and how it interacts with agricultural 
economies and ecologies in context. 
u.s. bIofuel ProductIon as clImate PolIcy
Biofuel production in the U.S. has a long history. The transportation fuel first emerged 
in the 1920s and 1930s at the urging of Henry Ford and farmer cooperative organiza-
tions. Ford was looking for a reliable fuel source for his new automobiles, and farm-
ers sought to diversify markets for their products, increase their control of the supply 
chain, and improve their energy self-sufficiency. The oil industry, fearing a loss of 
automobile fuel market share in the context of a developing U.S. gasoline market, along 
with changing agricultural markets, thwarted biofuel proponents’ early efforts 
(Carolan, 2010). Biofuels emerged again in the 1970s in the context of oil price spikes. 
This time, biofuels were positioned less as an agricultural product or the automobile 
fuel and more as a matter of national energy security –a concept then synonymous 
with independence from foreign oil (Labban, 2011). 
More recently, biofuels have been supported for their potential to mitigate climate 
change. Proponents hope to slow the release of greenhouse gases by substituting plant 
biomass for fossil fuel. In the U.S., regulatory responsibility for imple menting biofuel 
policy falls to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (epa), the entity responsible 
for air quality regulation. The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (rfs), first published in 
2005, determines biofuel production targets and sets criteria for determining different 
biofuels’ renewability. Renewability is principally defined as the degree to which a 
particular biofuel’s use reduces ghg emissions relative to gasoline. Indeed, the rfs 
represents “the first time that greenhouse gas emission performance is being applied in 
a regulatory context for a nationwide program” (Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 
2010: 14670). Since the regulatory authority for mandating the production of particu-
lar biofuels in the U.S. stems from their ability to reduce ghg emissions, the process for 
determining the carbon and energy balances of biofuel production cycles has been a 
major focal point of political negotiation.
When the rfs was enacted, ghg reduction targets were more an assumed than 
explicitly measured goal. As biofuel production ramped up, however, debate over 
the biofuels’ energy and ghg benefits grew. Different studies arrived at vastly different 
ghg and energy balance calculations. Part of the discrepancy stemmed from research-
ers’ decisions about the appropriate spatial and temporal boundaries to be used in 
modeling the ghg and energy budgets for various biofuels. For example, some in-
cluded the energy costs of the farmer’s lunch and the energy costs of farm machinery 
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manufacture, while others did not. The quantity of energy expended or ghg emitted 
in, for example, growing and processing an acre of corn also differed across studies 
(Farrell et al., 2006). 
The debate led to new efforts to determine official calculations of biofuels’ “re-
newability” or ghg reduction capacity and establish standards that biofuels must 
meet to qualify for support under the rfs. First generation biofuels, primarily corn-
based ethanol, must reduce ghgs relative to gasoline by 20 percent, while advanced 
biofuel must reduce ghg by 50 percent and cellulosic biofuel by 60 percent (Regulation 
of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 2010). epa efforts to measure the ghg emissions or sav-
ings of various biofuels were complicated by the widely varying study results. This 
feat became more difficult in 2008 when two studies published in Science (Searchinger 
et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008) argued that prior calculations were significantly 
flawed due to their omission of the carbon costs of indirect land-use change associated 
with increasing biofuel production. The studies asserted that increasing U.S. biofuel 
production raised global agricultural commodity demand and prices, inspiring in-
creased agricultural production abroad. The newly cultivated acreages, the studies 
said, could come from rainforest, grassland, or other habitat conversion, releasing 
much more carbon than would be saved through biofuel production. 
The epa took indirect land-use change into account for its next round of rfs rule-
making. In its revised analysis, the epa found that corn ethanol would reduce carbon 
emissions by 16 percent relative to gasoline, not the 20 percent required (Regulation 
of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 2009: 25042). Biofuel industry advocates responded 
swiftly and forcefully to the finding, which threatened future corn-ethanol produc-
tion increases. The Renewable Fuels Association expressed their “grave concern” 
about the epa’s findings and suggested epa calculations of corn ethanol’s carbon and 
energy costs to be “wholly insufficient” (Dinneen, 2009). After protracted negotiations 
over carbon and energy accounting methodologies, the epa found that corn ethanol 
would qualify. Citing new efficiencies in corn production and processing, the epa 
revised its estimates and pegged corn ethanol’s ghg reduction capability at 21 per-
cent, just over the 20 percent threshold.
Also important in securing corn ethanol’s dominant role in the rfs (currently 
over 90 percent of U.S. biofuel production) was the epa’s adoption of the “aggregate 
compliance approach” for monitoring U.S. land-use change. The second rfs stipulates 
that “renewable” biofuels cannot be derived from land converted to agricultural 
production after December 2007. The adoption of the aggregate compliance approach, 
as suggested by the National Corn Growers Association (see Informa Economics, 
2009; Voegele, 2009), means that the epa will monitor changes in the total number of 
agricultural acres only; these include pasture, cropland, and Conservation Reserve 
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Program (crp) lands. If, in aggregate, no new acres are added, all biofuel production 
is presumed to be from existing agricultural land and in compliance the rfs. 
Conversion of crp land, however, may have big negative effects. The crp pays 
farmers to “set aside” marginal cropland acreage as grassland to improve soil, water, 
and habitat quality in working agricultural landscapes. Converting crp to cropland 
releases carbon (see Gelfland et al., 2011), which is not counted against corn ethanol 
production in the rfs, in addition to eliminating many of the crp’s ecological benefits. 
Fargione et al. (2008), for example, found that converting one acre of land at the end of 
a 15-year crp contract creates a “carbon debt” that would take 48 years of corn ethanol 
production to repay (see Piñeiro et al., 2009; Searchinger et al., 2008; Uri and 
Bloodworth, 2000). As discussed below, since the biofuel boom began in the U.S., crp 
acreage has declined.
The epa’s finding that biofuel production, including corn-based ethanol, signifi-
cantly reduces ghg emissions relative to gasoline legitimizes U.S. biofuel production 
as effective climate change policy. This finding remains despite the fact that corn 
constitutes the vast majority of U.S. biofuel production, significantly reducing the 
value of U.S. biofuel production in mitigating climate change while creating the nu-
merous negative socio-ecological consequences discussed below. Cellulosic targets 
have been scaled back significantly, and it is still unclear when this fabled industry 
will emerge on a scale sufficient to provide a ghg-reducing liquid fuel alternative. 
And despite strong rhetoric about reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, the pro-
duction of biofuel does little to assuage growing U.S. oil imports. The conversion of 
the entire U.S. corn crop into biofuels –currently, approximately 40 percent of U.S. 
corn goes to ethanol– would displace only 12 percent of the U.S.’s growing gasoline 
consumption. When the biofuel production target of 36 billion gallons per year (bgy) 
is reached in 2022, the epa estimates they will replace a scant 7 percent of U.S. gaso-
line and diesel consumption, which is expected to continue to rise (epa, 2010). Biofuel 
policy seems to function simply to enable continued liquid fuel consumption, over 
and above supporting energy conservation. In short, current biofuel production is 
climate policy in name alone. That biofuels will not displace a significant amount of 
fossil fuel or reduce greenhouse gases suggests there may be alternative explana-
tions for their role and prominence in U.S. policy.
bIofuels as “envIronmental fIx”
Recent work in geography has examined processes and effects of contemporary en-
vironmental governance (see Castree, 2008; Himley, 2008; and Lemos and Agrawal, 
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2006 for reviews).1 A significant number of these scholars have examined processes 
of “nature’s neoliberalization,” which describes the restructuring of socio-ecological 
relations according to varied neoliberal or capital-centric logics. These modes of gov-
ernance include rollback of government intervention, deregulation, devolution of 
responsibility, commodification, privatization, and marketization of resources and 
environmental processes (see Peck and Tickell, 2002; Castree, 2008). One central goal 
of environmental governance under capitalism is to create and exploit resources to-
ward their profitable and efficient –if not equitable– exchange and use. As Castree 
(2008) puts it, what various modes of environmental governance have in common is 
that they serve as an “environmental fix” for capitalism’s problem of sustained growth. 
Multiple scholars have described capital-nature relations and this problem, that is, 
that capitalism must continue to grow, transforming and often undermining the so-
cial and ecological contexts and resources upon which it depends (e.g., Smith, 1984; 
O’Conner, 1998). In Castree’s synthetic formulation, the neoliberalization of nature 
is constituted by “conservation and its two antitheses of destroying existing and cre-
ating new biophysical resources.” He asserts, “It is not reducible to one or other ra-
tionale alone” (Castree, 2008: 150). That is, capitalist socio-natures simultaneously 
represent efforts to protect resources to enable future accumulation (conservation) 
and the creation and destruction of new and existing resources, which also allow for 
continued accumulation.
I argue that biofuels are one manifestation of nature under capitalism that con-
stitutes an “environmental fix.” First, making biofuel available as a “renewable” al-
ternative to fossil fuels conserves stored carbon, reducing ghg emissions. This legitimizes 
biofuel as a sustainable new resource, even if not as effective in emissions reductions 
as hoped. Meanwhile, intensified agricultural production and expanding liquid fuel 
use continues to facilitate accumulation, primarily for dominant agribusiness and 
oil industry actors that receive the bulk of profits from extracting and processing 
cheap feedstocks from the agricultural landscape.2 Indeed, support for biofuel pro-
duction in the U.S. resonates with a long history of agricultural policies subsidizing 
the sector in order to provide a broad basis for accumulation. Massive U.S. agricul-
tural subsidies provide cheap food for domestic consumption and international ex-
port, grain for livestock, inputs for industrial product manufacture, and other goods 
including automobile fuel (Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson, 1987; Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989). I discuss biofuel production’s interaction with agriculture and rural 
livelihoods in the U.S. Midwest in the next section. 
1  “Environmental governance” refers to the formal and informal institutional arrangements that influence 
resource use and allocation and, more broadly, mediate nature-society relations.
2  See Huber (2009) on the centrality of gasoline consumption in American culture and capitalist accumulation.
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As explained, U.S. biofuels production is mandated by the rfs and legitimized 
for its potential contribution to greenhouse gas reduction. In U.S. policy goals and 
metrics, biofuels’ consequences for agricultural economies are secondary. 
Mol (2007) points out that global biofuel support is constituted more by urban, 
global, or cosmopolitan consumers’ desires for cheap energy or ghg emissions miti-
gation than by rural areas looking for economic or ecological opportunity in agricul-
ture. In U.S. congressional debates over biofuel policy, for example, Minnesota 
Representative Guknecht, said, “The people who found the argument [for biofuels] 
interesting, it seems to me, were not necessarily farmers; it was people living in sub-
urban communities. They want cheaper energy. They want a cleaner environment. They 
want all the things that renewable energy can bring” (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2005: 6). Richard Lugar, a former Republican senator from Indiana put it this way: 
“We are talking about the ability of our country to continue on the lifestyle to which 
we are accustomed” (Truitt, 2007). 
The creation of new liquid fuel sources as a “fix” for increasing (urban) ghg-
intensive fossil fuel consumption, however, creates enormous and uneven change 
in agricultural economies and ecologies. In the following two sections of this arti-
cle, I discuss how biofuel production initiatives develop on the ground, in terms of 
both political economic and ecological outcomes. I draw on the U.S. case, based on 
document and policy analyses and qualitative field research conducted in Iowa 
between 2006 and 2010. I use Iowa as an example, because this U.S. state produces 
more corn and more biofuel than any other (usda, 2011). I first focus on the construc-
tion of biorefineries that process corn into ethanol. I then turn to interactions be-
tween biofuel industry development and farm economies. The final section of the 
article addresses the ecological consequences of pursuing biofuel production as an 
“environmental fix.”
bIofuels and agrIcultural economIes 
Biofuels were once a strategy for rural agricultural producers to improve energy 
self-reliance, own agricultural product-processing capacity, and diversify and im-
prove the market for their products. Today, as an “environmental fix,” biofuels fa-
cilitate accumulation in agribusiness and energy sectors. Relative to grain traders 
and processors and oil company investors in biofuel technologies and infrastruc-
ture, many farmers’ economic opportunity is limited by their marginal position in 
agricultural supply chains. In this section, I describe how biofuel initiatives connect 
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to rural economies, drawing on insights from agricultural political economy.3 I ex-
plain how those who have long benefitted from industrialized agriculture continue 
to benefit from biofuel-related climate policy, in addition to new entrant oil industry 
actors now in a position to profit from biofuels. I first discuss debates around the 
construction of biorefineries and then move on to farm-level dynamics associated 
with the U.S. biofuel boom. 
A Biorefinery Rush in the Corn Belt
The building of biofuel processing plants, or biorefineries, in the corn-producing 
region of the U.S. Midwest has a history of changing forms. During several periods, 
small farmer-owned biorefineries were the mainstay of ethanol initiatives. In the 
1920s and 1930s, farmers joined with Henry Ford and other ethanol enthusiasts to 
market farmer-owned fuel, ethanol branded as Argol. Ethanol rose again as an alter-
native fuel source as oil prices spiked in the 1970s, booming through the early 1980s. 
Farmers expanded their engagement with and ownership of the industry, with gov-
ernment backing for loans for plants producing less than 1 million gallons per year. 
Farmers would pool resources through cooperatives to finance small biorefineries 
and by 1984 at least 163 were in operation (Carolan, 2010; Morris, 2005). 
Nearly half of these farmer-owned biorefineries closed just a year later, after an 
oil price crash and oil industry efforts to slow the ethanol’s growth. By 1990, after this 
extreme market contraction and devaluation of rural ethanol investment had final-
ized, only 56 plants remained. During this period, new ethanol refinery construction 
was no longer financed by rural cooperatives. Archer Daniels Midland, one of the 
world’s most powerful grain merchants, began building ethanol refineries as part of 
their high-fructose corn syrup processing capabilities and came to control 75 percent 
of the ethanol market by 1990. After 1990, farmer-owned plants returned, but the 
size of these plants increased through the 1990s and into the early 2000s (by an aver-
age of 15-30 million gallons per year of production), along with the number of farm-
3  This analysis draws on policy and document analyses; analysis of secondary data on land use, agricultural 
production, and biofuel industry development; and analysis of qualitative data from field research conducted 
in Iowa between 2006 and 2010. In Iowa, I interviewed farmers, county conservation agents, state-level 
public officials, Iowa residents, and biofuel industry investors, owners, and participants. I employed a snowball 
sampling method to interview over 75 regional residents, conservationists, and farmers. Interviews were 
transcribed, coded, and analyzed by theme. I focused semi-structured interviews in Northeastern Iowa, an 
area selected for 1) high farm-type diversity, allowing for analysis of agricultural change across production 
strategies; 2) a topographically varied landscape making conservation practice important; and 3) the pres-
ence of refineries and engagement with the biofuel industry. Participant observation of conservation practice 
planning and implementation were also completed in Northeastern Iowa. 
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er shareholders (up to 25 000). By the time the first rfs was mandated in 2005, linking 
biofuels with climate change mitigation policy, circumstances had changed again. In 
2004, the first 100-million-gallon dry-mill ethanol plant opened in South Dakota, which 
created a new standard for biorefinery size. Since then, 100-million-gallon and larger 
biorefineries have been constructed at a staggering pace (Morris, 2005). 
In 2000, there were 54 U.S. biorefineries producing 1.6 billion gallons per year 
(bgy); by 2011, 204 biorefineries can produce 13.5 bgy of biofuels annually (rfa, 2011). 
In Iowa, the focal point of this research, biofuel production increased over four fold, from 
859 million gallons per year in 2002, to 3.9 bgy in 2011 (see Figure 2; Iowa rfa, 2011). 
Both federal and state policies have supported biofuel refinery construction with tax 
incentives, loan guarantees, and other incentives for production and distribution in fra-
 s tructure. These are in addition to tariffs on ethanol imports, subsidies, and mandates 
for production. This new wave of biorefinery construction provides the oppor tunity 
to ask how the developing biofuels industry, this time connected to climate change 
mitigation, will connect with rural agricultural producing areas.
Figure 2
U.S. AND IOWA ETHANOL PRODUCTION 
Source: rfa, 2011.
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In the latest biorefinery boom, financial backing came from sources both inter-
nal and external to construction locations. During biofuel production’s initial re-ex-
pansion in the U.S. Midwest, construction costs for a new 100-million-gallon-per-year 
biorefinery were approximately US$136 million (Farrell, 2007). In Iowa, where this 
research was conducted, rural residents would gather in hotel rooms, coffee shops, 
and high school gymnasiums to hear biofuel companies pitch investment opportu-
nities in new plants. Rural resident investments were significant, varying from US$5 000 
to US$25 000 or more. Initially, rural residents were thrilled at the opportunity to cash in 
on the “dot-corn” boom, as it was dubbed in news media accounts. Hoping for a rare 
income opportunity, many rural residents jumped at the chance to participate in the 
growing biofuels industry. During the initial industry boom, Morris (2007), drawing on 
an Iowa State University Study, found that a five-year investment in a biorefinery 
would bring an average return of 23 percent. This represents a significant opportu-
nity for rural residents, considering farmers in 70 percent of Iowa’s counties can expect 
to return only 2.5 percent on their investment in agricultural land.
In northeastern Iowa, several farmers interviewed told of a US$30-million capi-
tal drive ending after just seven hours. “That’s how long it took people to write US$30 
million worth of checks,” said one corn and hog farmer (Pers. comm., 2007a).4 A biofu-
els fundraiser interviewed boasted that it took him less than hour to raise US$700 000 
from seven farmers for the construction of a different plant (Pers. comm., 2009b). 
Speaking during boom time, a major partner in an ethanol refinery jokingly com-
plained that her family was “tired of hearing her preach the ‘good news of ethanol,’ 
but they’re not tired of the dividend checks coming in at Christmas time” (Pers. 
comm., 2007a). 
Despite the good times seemingly arriving with the biofuel industry in rural 
Iowa, some residents questioned whether the investment in corn and biofuel produc-
tion was good for their economy, especially as market conditions began to change. 
One cautionary story often told in northeastern Iowa recounted how a biorefinery 
fundraiser fled to Florida with hundreds of thousands of dollars from regional resi-
dents as investments when industry profitability problems emerged. Even before 
the industry contracted, many rural residents became concerned about local govern-
ment investments in biorefineries, environmental quality deterioration, water-use 
issues, and infrastructure expansion costs (see also Selfa, 2010). For example, the 
New York Times reported that in summer 2006, a Cargill biodiesel refinery in Iowa 
Falls, Iowa, “improperly disposed of 135 000 gallons of liquid oil and grease, which 
ran into a stream killing hundreds of fish” (Goodman, 2008). Air quality concerns 
4  All sources are protected by confidentiality requirements of the Institutional Review Board at the University 
of California, Santa Cruz.
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also became prominent after the Bush administration lowered the standards for 
emissions requirements for biorefineries (Hunt, 2007). In some cases, this helps to 
accommodate on-site coal burning for providing biorefinery power, seriously threat-
ening the credibility of biofuels as ghg reducers and contributing to local air pollution. 
Other topics for debate in siting biorefineries included the costs of expanding 
railroad tracks and road infrastructure to accommodate new plants. Many residents 
lamented the consequences of sharply increased truck traffic for local roadways: semi-
trucks carry corn to biorefineries and railroads transport ethanol out. County or munici-
pal financial resources were often offered to help improve transportation infras tructure 
facilitating a biorefinery’s consumption of 600 acres worth of corn per day. Some 
residents argued that their city and counties should not be forced to bear the cost. In 
other cases, biorefineries were exempted from significant taxes; sometimes these 
agreements called for complete property tax exemption for up to 20 years, eliminat-
ing a significant potential source of rural income in the biofuel boom.
My research engaged with several Iowa towns considering building a biorefin-
ery. Manchester, Iowa, was one town whose residents were considering hosting an 
ethanol plant on the outskirts of town. The city of Manchester had agreed to grant a 
biofuel company US$6.6 million through a 10-year property tax abatement, extend 
the sewer systems to land annexed for construction, and make roadway improve-
ments to accommodate increased truck traffic. The Iowa Department of Economic 
Development offered the biofuel company a US$10.4-million sales and use tax cred-
it in return for the approximately 50 jobs to be created by the biorefinery. Interviews 
with residents and public meeting records raised a series of representative issues, 
including concerns about water use –the new plant would consume thousands of 
gallons of water per day (estimated at 3 gallons/liters water per gallon/liter ethanol 
produced); increased truck traffic effects on children’s’ safety; local air quality; zon-
ing exemptions granted for the plant limiting potentially lucrative commercial de-
velopment; high costs of incentivizing construction, despite biorefinery boasts it could 
pay for itself in three to seven years; and the consequences for the local livestock 
industry. Manchester residents interviewed were glad that biorefinery construction 
was not rushed through; soon after negotiations were complete, biofuel industry 
profitability suffered. The Manchester biorefinery developer, All Fuels and Energy 
Company, pulled out of the deal and sold the land annexed for the plant’s construction 
in order to maintain liquidity in the face of an impending financial crisis. 
These dynamics were characteristic of many biorefinery development plans 
across the state. After significant investments from rural residents and state, local, and 
federal government agencies, biorefinery construction seems to be paying much less 
back in rural economic benefits than was initially hoped. Northeastern Iowa residents 
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interviewed began expressing skepticism that their investments in the industry 
were profitable for investors or the community. Excitement about rural economic 
opportunity quickly faded as residents came to realize biofuel production’s profit-
ability was closely tied to volatile corn and oil markets. As agricultural commodity 
prices climbed in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, biorefineries in Iowa strug-
gled to make their biofuel pay, especially with greatly expanded production capacity 
nationwide. Compounding problems, oil prices fell after the financial bubble burst, 
making biofuel production even less competitive with gasoline. 
By late 2008, approximately 10 biofuel companies had closed 24 plants in the 
U.S., with U.S. biorefineries producing at nearly 20 percent under capacity (Krauss, 
2009; rfa, 2009). A 2007 University of Nebraska study pointed out that if such a con-
traction occurred, smaller or locally owned biorefineries were the most likely to go 
out of business; they lacked the economies of scale and significant capital backing 
enjoyed by larger-capacity plants (Peters, 2007). Indeed, in 2005, 46 percent were 
cooperatively or locally owned, but by 2009, fewer than 23 percent of biorefineries 
were under local ownership (epa, 2006; rfa, 2009).
Another northeastern Iowa town at the center of the biofuel industry develop-
ment debate was Dyersville, the site of a biorefinery built by VeraSun in 2008. VeraSun, 
an independent company from South Dakota had just eclipsed Archer Daniels Midland 
to become the nation’s top ethanol producer. VeraSun had recently doubled its etha-
nol interests to US$1.2 billion, producing 1.635 billion gallons per year. Just two 
months after the Dyersville, Iowa, plant opened, however, VeraSun filed for bank-
ruptcy. VeraSun had signed up to purchase high priced corn to feed its biorefineries, 
just before oil and commodity markets took a dive in late 2008. The company lost 
US$476 million in one quarter and Valero Energy Corporation, the U.S.’s largest 
gasoline refiner, purchased seven of VeraSun’s biorefineries for US$477 million, less 
than half the cost of construction. Meanwhile, VeraSun petitioned a bankruptcy court 
judge for the right to deny contracts made with Dyersville area farmers.
Just two months after opening, the Dyersville biorefinery closed. Valero did not 
purchase the plant and residents were concerned about the loss of approximately 50 
jobs, the status of contracts to produce corn for the plant, associated regional corn 
market volatility, and the costs incurred in attracting the recently failed biorefinery 
(Pers. comm., 2008a and 2008b; Porter, 2008a, 2008b, and 2009). Some were hopeful that 
commodity markets and the biofuel industry would stabilize, but many remained 
concerned that regaining the benefits promised by their investments would not be 
possible (Pers. comm., 2008a; 2008b). Here, I quote a telling passage from the local 
newspaper on the subject: 
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[VeraSun] issued a statement saying that farmers who delivered corn before Oct. 11 [2008] 
might not promptly receive payment. Finally, several area producers say they received a 
check from the company. An accompanying note said if farmers endorsed the check, they 
agreed to receive market cost for the corn instead of the agreed contract price. “That means 
I’m not going to get as much as I thought,” said Dick Recker, of Dyersville. He started 
selling corn to the VeraSun plant in July for about $7 per bushel. He entered into another 
contract to deliver grain in July 2009, but a recent conversation with a VeraSun representa-
tive left him discouraged. “The price might have to be negotiated at the time of delivery,” 
Recker said. “He said if corn went back up close to what we got a contract for, then we’d 
be OK, but if market price is $4, then he said we’d have to talk about it.” With the Chicago 
Board of Trade closing Friday at $3.80 per bushel, Recker knows the future looks dim. By 
cutting the price per bushel in half, he could be out more than $40 000 next year.
. . . “Well, I would have to say, it’s almost like, ‘I told you so,’” said Becky Schwendinger. 
She lives on the west end of Dyersville, close to the plant and opposed its construction from 
the beginning. “It was rushed through,” she said. “The city didn’t care that we had 600 
signatures opposing it. That meant nothing to them.” Another neighbor to the plant, Marty 
Steffen, who lives less than a mile from the facility, said the plant promised an economic 
boost and is failing to deliver. “My thought is that the light at the end of the tunnel isn’t 
as bright as was originally portrayed,” he said. “Don’t get me wrong, I want this town to 
prosper. I want the farmers to prosper, but in one sense, Dyersville put all its eggs in one 
basket.” (Porter 2008b)
Work on the political economy of agriculture can help put this biorefinery boom 
and bust in the context of farm-level dynamics. A large body of research in geography, 
rural studies and sociology, and agrifood studies has addressed the political eco-
nomic dynamics of the U.S. Midwestern agricultural regions (e.g., Friedmann, 1978; 
Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson, 1987; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Lighthall and 
Roberts, 1995; Marsden et al., 1996; Page, 1997; Heffernan, 2000). Researchers have 
described how agriculture-related industries rose alongside agriculture in the U.S. 
Midwest, with agriculture providing an important basis for broader U.S. capitalist 
industrial growth, just as industry has been central to urban-rural relations and the 
functioning of farm economies since the late nineteenth century (Page and Walker, 
1991). Biorefineries constitute another iteration of expansion of rural agricultural 
product processing capacity. 
Researchers have also described the process of agro-industrialization and its 
farm-level effects. Over time, the agricultural sector has lost control over the agricul-
tural product supply chain. Primary farm products are reduced to simple inputs for 
industrial processes, with the industrial sector capturing more of the “value added.” 
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Farms also increasingly buy inputs from off-farm sources, rather than providing for 
them through their own labor and farm biological processes (e.g., nitrogen fertilizer, 
pesticides, and purchased seeds replace animal manure, crop rotation, and seed sav-
ing, respectively) (Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson, 1987). Agricultural industrializa-
tion on these farms has increased farm productivity, but also marginalized farmers’ 
position in agriculture. Farms’ economic roles become industrial input buyer and pro-
vider of simplified agricultural products for industry, like corn, which can be exchanged 
as livestock feed, food, fuel feedstock, or industrial product input (e.g., plastic) (Goodman 
and Redclift, 1991). Farms and farm labor also become economically marginalized, 
as these relationships mean industry improves its profitability and economic stability, 
while agriculture takes on more supply-chain risk due to its reduced market control 
and continued vulnerability to market volatility and variation in the biophysical 
conditions of production (see FitzSimmons, 1986; 1990). 
This model of agricultural production creates an agriculture that serves as a 
source of accumulation for industrial sectors. Biofuels production fits this mold. As 
a state-supported, agriculturally-based industrial product, biofuels provide an enor-
mous investment opportunity for industry in research and processing and distribu-
tion infrastructure. In addition to agribusiness and oil industry investment in and 
domination of a consolidating biorefining industry, oil company investments in fu-
ture biofuel technology research and development initiatives have also been signifi-
cant (see Table 1). This trend may indicate that real profitability in biofuel production 
is likely to be in owning the engineering technological resources necessary for ad-
vanced biofuel production (cf., Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson, 1987).
In short, biofuels are meant to be a cheaper –if not more renewable– alternative 
to gasoline that builds on the capacity of industry to accumulate from agricultural labor 
and biological processes. In contrast to past biofuel initiatives, this time, biofuel pro-
duction has received substantial investment from the oil industry, as seen in the table 
above. Carolan (2010) suggests this may be because biofuels constitute an alterna-
tive liquid fuel, not an alternative to liquid fuel. In the remainder of this section I 
describe how U.S. biofuel policy, volatile markets, and circuits of agro-industrial and 
energy investment and exchange offer little lasting rural benefit. Rather, building on 
current agro-industrial political economic structures with a biofuel industry repro-
duces political economic and ecological marginalization characteristic of industrialized 
agricultural production in the U.S. Midwest. 
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Extracting Fuel from Farms
In order for biofuel production to be profitable, agricultural products must be abun-
dant and relatively cheap. In the U.S., this is made possible by federal subsidies for 
agriculture, asymmetrical global and domestic market relationships that drive agri-
cultural prices down, and vast acreages of industrialized farming operations designed 
to continually increase agricultural productivity with the application of new seed 
technologies, fossil-fuel-based fertilizers and agrichemicals, and large investments in 
farm machinery and precision agricultural technologies. The U.S. rfs explicitly builds 
on this agricultural capacity and its assumed trajectory.
Since rfs passage in 2005, corn acres planted have markedly increased. In 2000, 
75.7 million acres of corn were planted in the U.S.; by 2012 this number is 95.9 million 
acres, representing the largest area planted since 1937 (see Figure 3). While rising 
production levels and increasing prices appear to be a boon for U.S. farmers, analy-
sis reveals otherwise. Even a brief survey of media coverage of the ethanol boom 
revealed contradictory descriptions of rapid biofuel industry development. Some 
Table 1
BIOFUEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING
Funder Funded
Amount 
(US dollars)
BP UC-Berkeley $500 000 000
Exxon Mobile Stanford $100 000 000
U.S. Department of Agriculture Michigan State University $50 000 000
Chevron UC-Davis $25 000 000
Conoco-Phillips Iowa State University $22 500 000
U.S. Department of Energy  — $944 000
Chevron Georgia Institute of Technology $12 000 000
U.S. Department of Agriculture Washington State
University
$840 000
U.S. Department of Agriculture Baylor University $492 000
Chevron Texas A & M University Undisclosed
Source: Carolan, 2010.
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farmers welcomed the boom, saying, “It seems like a farmer gets one or two homeruns 
in his career. Is this our homerun? I think so” (Paulson, 2007). Other Iowa corn growers 
were more cautious, saying, “I don’t want to get caught up in the euphoria” (Etter, 
2007). A Minnesota corn grower said to a reporter, “Four-dollar corn is a bad thing 
–write that down” (Birger, 2007). The latter feared a bust, although that would not come 
until corn prices reached heights of US$7.00 per bushel. 
Figure 3
U.S. CORN USE
Source: usda, 2012.
My research in Iowa asked farmers about the costs, benefits, and risks of devel-
oping a biofuel industry in their region. I found that despite high agricultural com-
modity prices, farmers failed to receive significant profits. As prices rose for their 
products, input costs also increased, contributing to slim margins. Between 2006 and 
2007, nitrogen fertilizer prices rose 26 percent and would continue to rise (usda, 
2008a; Westhoff, Thompson, and Meyer, 2008). Land prices in Iowa also jumped an 
average of 19 percent between 2007 and 2008 and continue to increase today (usda, 
2008b). One interviewee, for example, simply stated, “I made more money on $2.00 
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corn…. The price of land went up; the price of inputs went up…. There’s less profit in 
an acre of corn now than there was five years ago. I can show you my books” (Pers. 
comm., 2009a). A usda Farm Service Agency representative identified the cost-price 
squeeze farmers faced as input prices rose, suggesting input suppliers increased 
prices behind commodity price spikes: “If your making it on this end, they’ll be get-
ting it on the other” (Pers. comm., 2007d). Another farmer interviewed said simply, 
“They keep ’er spent,” implying that farmers’ income is a known quantity to be 
chipped away at by industrial farm input suppliers (Pers. comm., 2007a). 
Farmers interviewed also described increasing competition between farmers for 
land, as commodity and input prices rose with national biofuel production mandates. 
Interviewees described increasing rental rates, which only the largest farms could easily 
afford to pay. One corn and hog farmer described his frustration with increasing com-
 petition in regional agriculture and the imperative to continually reinvest farm profits 
in expansion, known as the “production treadmill” (see Cochrane, 1979). He said, “You 
have to be running pretty fast just to stay in place….  We just need to figure out a way 
to keep people from trying to farm the whole damn world” (Pers. comm., 2007b). 
Iowa livestock farmers fared even worse during the initial phase of rapid bio-
fuel industry growth. Dependent on the grain ethanol refineries were increasingly 
consuming, livestock farmers saw margins fall even more drastically than grain farm-
ers. One hog farmer interviewed complained that the new ethanol plant in town had 
made livestock farming a “break-even proposition” –he hadn’t earned an income for 
his work in two years (Pers. comm., 2007a). Members of a northeastern Iowa farm-
ing cooperative said that the new large-volume corn purchasers made it difficult for 
them to secure grain supplies to sell to their livestock-producing customers. The 
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, brazenly oppositional to ethanol, put it this 
way: “This ethanol binge is insane…. This talk about energy independence and 
wrapping yourself in the flag and singing God Bless America –all that’s going to 
come at a severe cost to another part of the economy” (Herbst, 2007). 
Despite assertions that rural benefits will arrive with a booming biofuels indus-
try, the costs, risks, and benefits of biofuel production fell very unevenly across live-
stock producers, grain farmers, and biorefinery investors. These findings echo 
research in agricultural political economy that describes farms’ relatively marginal 
economic standing with respect to agricultural input suppliers and commodity pro-
cessors. While those investing in advanced biofuel technology or those with the 
market power to invest in infrastructure and weather initial market volatility may 
benefit, farm-level gains look less certain. 
The agricultural outcomes and politics associated with the proposal to use bio-
fuels as a ghg strategy should not be missed. Geographer David Harvey’s 1996 work 
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on understanding the politics underlying socio-ecological projects is insightful here. 
He writes, “One path towards consolidation of a particular set of social relations, 
therefore, is to undertake an ecological transformation which requires the reproduction 
of those social relations in order to sustain it” (184). Simply put, increasing biofuel 
production under an industrialized agricultural model that rewards already domi-
nant agribusiness, industrial, and energy actors will do little to generate new, lasting 
benefits for biofuel feedstock producers. 
Biofuels in the Agro-ecological Context
As discussed, biofuel policy is positioned as climate policy in the U.S. Renewable 
Fuel Standard. This conditions biofuel production’s role as an “environmental fix,” 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining economic growth opportuni-
ties for some. Despite biofuels’ questionable contributions to ghg emissions reductions, 
the ecological consequences of biofuel industry development are enormous. At the 
outset, for example, the U.S. epa noted that rfs implementation “threatens to erase 
some of the gains of the last 20 years of Farm Bill and Clean Water Act implementation” 
(epa, 2006: 23). Nonetheless, as a “fix” for climate change, biofuel policy’s regulatory 
science has focused more on ghg emissions and less on ecological dimensions of 
biofuel production. I describe some of the ecological consequences of rapidly increas-
ing agricultural commodity production in the U.S. in this section. 
As the ethanol industry grew, Iowa farmers increased corn production from ap-
proximately 11.7 million acres to 14.2 million acres between 2001 and 2007, and corn 
plantings have remained high (see Figure 4; usda, 2011). As more private agricultural 
land becomes devoted to crop production, conservation practices are suffering. These 
practices are particularly important in regions where much of the landscape is de-
voted to intensive agricultural production. Intensive agricultural landscapes often 
have highly impaired waterways, persistent problems with soil erosion, and little na-
tive habitat. Over 90 percent of Iowa’s land area is devoted to farming and in 2008, 
nearly half of Iowa’s 1 108 water bodies were considered impaired by the epa (idnr, 
2010). Intensive agricultural production in the Mississippi River Basin, where Iowa 
lies, contributes to the hypoxic conditions in the Gulf of Mexico (Rabalais, Turner, 
and Wiseman, 2002; Donner and Kucharik, 2008). Since Iowa prairie was plowed in 
the mid-1800s, over half of the state’s 14-16 inches of topsoil have disappeared with 
erosion. Iowa also ranks last among U.S. states for habitat availability, with only 0.01 
percent of native prairies remaining. 
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Corn production, in particular, exacerbates many of these problems. Corn is the 
most erosive and nutrient-intensive of the major row crops grown in the U.S. Midwest 
(Pimentel et al., 1995; Pimentel, 2005). Corn’s low nitrogen-use efficiency of 37 percent 
also means much of the fertilizer is not used by the plant, increasing opportunity for 
nutrient run-off (Doberman and Cassman, 2002). These persistent ecological problems 
associated with corn production have led to estimates that nutrient loading into the 
Gulf of Mexico is likely to increase between 10 and 34 percent due to increased corn 
ethanol production (Donner and Kucharik, 2008). Nutrient management problems 
are exacerbated when corn is planted continuously, instead of rotated in with nitrogen-
fixing or animal-fodder and cover crops like soy, alfalfa, oats, or hay, as has been the 
case amidst an ethanol boom. Corn production also emits more greenhouse gases 
than most crops, due to its high nitrogen-fertilizer use requirements, compromising 
its ghg reduction potential (Meyer-Aurich et al., 2006; and see Gelfland et al., 2011).
As biofuel production has increased, acreage enrolled in U.S. conservation pro-
grams, particularly the Conservation Reserve Program (crp) has also sharply declined 
nationwide. The crp was developed in the midst of the 1980s U.S. farm crisis charac-
terized by collapsing markets for agricultural products, widespread farm debt and 
foreclosures, and chronic overproduction. The crp was designed to decrease agricul-
tural supply by removing marginal land from production and to provide ecological 
benefits. The crp has proved highly effective for reducing soil erosion and surface 
water pollution (Davie and Lant 1994), thus maintaining important wildlife habitats 
(Johnson and Schwartz, 1993; Best et al., 1997; Coppedge et al., 2001). Recent research 
also shows that crp lands sequester large amounts of carbon and that the land-use 
change associated with increasing corn production negates the ghg reduction bene-
fits of these biofuels (Piñeiro et al., 2009; Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008; 
Gelfland et al., 2011). 
Throughout the U.S., since 2006, crp acres dropped from 36.7 to 29.6  million (see 
Figure 5) (usda Farm Service Agency, 2011). Between 2006 and 2010, Iowa lost over 
320 000 acres or nearly 20 percent of its crp land. Secchi et al. (2009) estimate that if 
crp acreage losses continue with rising corn prices, soil, nitrogen, and phosphorous 
pollution from Iowa agricultural lands will significantly increase. These trends were 
particularly pronounced in northeastern Iowa, which is more topographically var-
ied than much of the state. The topographical variation in the region contributes to 
its diverse agricultural base, which includes mixed crop and livestock farms and 
greater variety in the crops planted, since more steeply sloped or highly erodible 
land is used for pasture or animal-fodder crops. Conservation practices and diversi-
fied farming strategies that integrate multiple crops are particularly important for 
maintaining environmental quality in the region. Using this highly erodible land for crop 
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cultivation would disproportionately increase soil erosion and nutrient run-off. None-
theless, crp participation declined substantially (see Figure 6) (usda Farm Service 
Agency, 2011). Farmers interviewed cited multiple reasons for ending enrollment in 
the conservation program. The most common explanation was the most straightfor-
ward: corn prices made government conservation contract payments uncompetitive. 
As land prices rose, farming or renting land to be farmed became attractive options 
for landowners. Land that would have been considered too marginal to profitably 
cultivate became valuable as cropland when commodity prices rose high enough to 
justify planting for low yields. Even when an agricultural producer wanted to main-
tain conservation practices, his/her farm management decisions became constrained 
by the competitive dynamics in agriculture, forcing expanded production at a time of 
high prices (on these dynamics, see Lawrence, Cheshire, and Richards, 2004; Foster 
and Magdoff, 2000). One retiring farmer who decided to rent out land for crop culti-
vation instead of maintaining its enrollment in conservation programs said, “The 
big boys [large-scale producers expanding production] have their eyes on my land 
now . . . and they’ll give me two times as much as [government conservation programs 
will]. How can I resist that?” (Pers. comm., 2008). 
Figure 5
U.S. AND IOWA CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM ENROLLMENT
1986-2010
Source: usda Farm Service Agency, 2011.
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 Northeastern Iowa farmers also changed agricultural practices on working ag-
ricultural land (i.e., not “set-aside,” marginal land), which contributed toward ecologi-
cal goals that were not necessarily rewarded through government payments. As noted, 
many farmers ended crop rotations in order to plant more corn. Iowa soybean acre-
age was reduced from over 11 million acres to 8.6 million acres between 2001 and 2007 
(usda, 2011). Integrated crop-livestock operations also began to convert pasture and 
hay acreages into crop production, speeding up a long trend toward the disintegration 
of livestock and crop farms. Iowa pasture acreage fell from over 2 million acres in 
1997 to approximately 830 000 acres in 2007, while the number of farms with pasture 
declined from 30 000 to 13 500 (usda, 2011). Forage crop cultivation in northeastern 
Iowa also declined (see Figure 7); like pasture, land devoted to forage crops is not 
eligible for conservation programs that offset losses for improving environmental 
stewardship (see also Atwell, 2010). Nonetheless, forage crops like hay often provide 
a way for farmers to produce a profitable crop on marginal land, feed livestock, and 
break up row-crop planting to improve soil and nutrient retention. 
In short, despite years of U.S. investment in improving conservation practice on 
agricultural lands, new biofuel production mandates, masquerading as climate pol-
icy, have significantly set back these efforts. A northeastern Iowa corn farmer said, 
“We’re tearing the soils up so fast, in such a short time, to gain so little. It’s just not worth 
it to me” (Pers. comm., 2009a). One regional usda Natural Resource Conservation 
Service agent had this to say about increasing corn production’s influence on conser-
vation practice: “If that’s what ethanol does, I’m not sure who it’s helping” (Pers. 
comm., 2008b). These sentiments and agricultural practice changes encapsulate the 
consequences of increasing biofuel production for ghg mitigation under climate policy, 
demonstrating that one “environmental fix” can produce numerous unintended 
socio-ecological consequences. 
conclusIon 
Rapid biofuel production increases, legitimized by marginal ghg reductions, mean 
big changes in the political economic dynamics in agriculture that influence rural eco-
nomic opportunity, as well as in the agro-ecological outcomes of producing regions. In 
this article, I have characterized some of these changes in socio-ecological relation-
ships, focusing on Iowa, where much of the U.S.’s initial biofuel production is occur-
ring. At the outset, I established that biofuel production is not currently a promising 
means for supplying adequate liquid fuel alternatives (for U.S. energy security), even 
if production increases are staggering. U.S. gasoline consumption simply overwhelms 
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the capacity to convert agricultural resources into automobile fuel. I also established 
that current U.S. biofuel production has fallen short on substantially reducing ghg 
emissions to address climate change. ghg savings from using biofuels in place of ga-
soline are marginal and perhaps negative, depending on where carbon and energy 
budget boundaries are drawn and how land-use change is accounted for in biofuel 
lifecycle analyses. Cellulosic ethanol has thus far failed to emerge to provide a more 
carbon-negative and ecologically benign option as was hoped; in fact, the epa has signi-
ficantly scaled back cellulosic production targets. 
Biofuel production’s apparent failure to meet these two principle policy goals, 
suggests the need to explore other outcomes and logics of environmental governance. 
I have argued that biofuel production can be productively understood as an “envi-
ronmental fix,” a reorganization of socio-ecological relations aimed at addressing 
crises of capitalism. Biofuels are a potentially ghg-reducing fuel substitute support-
ers hope can address the climate crisis for capitalism: ghg emissions may limit future 
opportunities for growth and accumulation. Meanwhile, this “fix” maintains oppor-
tunities for accumulation by providing 1) investment and opportunities for domi-
nant agribusiness, industrial, and energy sector actors; and 2) a liquid fuel substitute 
to maintain automobile fuel consumption, leaving the structure and function of dis-
proportionately high U.S. (transportation and other) energy use intact. 
I described the consequences of this fix as experienced in rural areas of biofuel 
production, focusing on Iowa. Biofuels are being built on the infrastructure and in-
stitutions of industrialized agriculture. Consonant with research in agricultural po-
litical economy, this means that outcomes for rural areas appear less promising than the 
opportunity for investment and profit the largest biofuel companies enjoy. The latter 
were able to weather the initial period of volatility and the 2008 financial crisis. Mean-
while, farmer ownership of biorefineries declined and farmers’ marginal place in 
agricultural supply chain has meant that few profits from the agricultural commodity 
price boom have remained on the farm. Livestock producers have been especially vul-
nerable during the rapid expansion of the biofuel industry. 
In ecological terms, biofuel production actually does little to establish the “fix” 
sought, even if biofuels qualify as ghg-reducers in regulatory terms. Globally, and 
independently of their carbon and energy budgets, biofuel production has inspired 
massive ecological change. Drawing on the U.S. case, I described significant losses to 
conservation program acreage, increases in soil erosion and nutrient pollution, and 
the reorganization of agricultural practices toward intensified commodity crop pro-
duction and away from integrated crop-livestock operations. The narrow regulatory 
purview of the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard, focused on the carbon content of 
biofuel alone, means that many of these ecological and political economic issues go 
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unaddressed in policy. Since future global investment in biofuels is likely to increase, 
this research should serve as a cautionary tale about how policy might condition 
investment in biofuel production expansion. 
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